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The Florida Supreme Court vs.
The United States Supreme Court:
the Florida Decision in Conner v. State and
the Federal Interpretation of Confrontation
and Federal Rule of Evidence 807
INTRODUCTION
An eighty-four-year old man, who lives alone, has his home broken
into one night. The armed intruder ties the elderly man to a chair with
his own suspenders and proceeds to ransack the house. He takes the
elderly man's money and items from the home, including the telephone,
before leaving the residence. The elderly man, despite suffering from
occasional memory loss as well as hearing and vision problems, is able
to provide the police with a statement a few hours after the incident. He
gives the authorities a sworn statement two weeks later. With the help
of a confidential informant, the police are able to arrest a suspect. Sadly,
the victim dies two months after the arrest. Buried with the victim is the
only potential eyewitness testimony to the attack. So the question for
the prosecution becomes-what to do now? Is this defendant who vio-
lently attacked an eighty-four year old man at his home now going to go
free? Should this dangerous defendant be released, only to continue ter-
rorizing and exploiting other elderly victims?
This is exactly what the Florida Supreme Court decided in Conner
v. State.' The aforementioned scenario depicts the facts of Conner. The
elderly man's name was Earl Ford and the defendant was David J. Con-
ner.2 In the case the state tried to offer Ford's statements under Florida's
hearsay exception for the elderly, section 90.803(24), Florida Statutes.
After the trial court decided it would consider allowing Mr. Ford's state-
ments to be admitted under this exception, Conner fought the statute,
claiming it was unconstitutional.' Both the trial court and the intermedi-
ate appellate court upheld the statute's constitutionality.4 The Florida
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court and allowed Conner
to go free.5
1. 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).
2. Id. at 952.
3. Id. at 953.
4. Conner v. State, 709 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
5. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 960.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
HISTORY OF CONNER V. STATE
David Conner was facing armed burglary, armed kidnapping, and
armed robbery charges in Florida's Tenth Judicial Circuit based on his
alleged 1995 attack on Earl Ford. The problem for the state was how to
get Mr. Ford's statements before the jury, since he was no longer alive
to testify. The statements would have fallen under the hearsay definition
in section 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes, since they would be used to
establish the truth of the matter asserted, namely, that Mr. Conner was
the attacker.6 Unfortunately, the state did not take measures to preserve
Mr. Ford's testimony prior to trial, as required by Florida Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 3.1900). 7 Therefore, in order for Mr. Ford's statements
about his attack to be admitted, the statements would have to be admit-
ted under a hearsay exception.
The prosecution in Conner sought to introduce the statements pur-
suant to Florida's hearsay exception for statements by the elderly.8 The
6. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FLA. STAT.
§ 90.801(1)(c) (2000).
7. Under this statute, a witness's testimony can be preserved for later use if the witness
becomes unavailable at the time of trial. It provides, in relevant part:
After an indictment or information on which a defendant is to be tried is filed, the
defendant or the state may apply for an order to perpetuate testimony. The
application shall be verified or supported by the affidavits of credible persons that a
prospective witness reside beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court or may be
unable to attend or be prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that the witness's
testimony is material, and that it is necessary to take the deposition to prevent a
failure of justice. The court shall order a commission to be issued to take the
deposition of the witnesses to be used in the trial and that any designated books,
papers, documents, or tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time
and place. If the application is made within 10 days before the trial date, the court
may deny the application.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(j)(1).
8. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1999):
HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF ELDERLY PERSONS OR DISABLED ADULT.
(a) Unless the source of the information or the method or circumstances by which
the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court
statement made by an elderly person or disabled person, as defined in s. 825.101,
describing any act of abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery
or aggravated battery or assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery, or any other
violent act on the declarant elderly person or disabled adult, not otherwise
admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability. In making its determination, the court may consider the mental and
physical age and maturity of the elderly person or disabled adult, the nature and
duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to the offender, the
reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the elderly person or disabled adult, and
any factor deemed appropriate; and
2. The elderly person or disabled adult either:
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Florida Legislature enacted this exception to allow statements by elderly
victims of battery, assault, and certain sex crimes to be used as evi-
dence. 9 The statute also requires that before such statements are allowed
in, the defendant must receive notice and a hearing must be held to
determine if the circumstances sufficiently protect the statement's relia-
bility and trustworthiness.'I Since Mr. Ford's statement to the police
did not fall under any of Florida's other hearsay exceptions, section
90.803(24) would be the only way for his statements to be used as
evidence.
Prior to the trial, the state filed notice, pursuant to section
90.803(24), of its intent to introduce Mr. Ford's statements." In the
hearings conducted to determine if the statements were admissible under
the exception, the trial court found that Mr. Ford met the "elderly per-
son" definition set out in section 825.101(5), Florida Statutes.'2 The
judge found that Mr. Ford was a person over sixty years of age who was
suffering from the infirmities of age to the extent that such conditions
impaired his ability to care for himself.' 3 The trial court reserved ruling
on the admissibility of the statements themselves, noting that evidence
would have to be presented as to the trustworthiness of the statements,
as well as the declarant's condition, before such a decision could be
made. '"
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is corroborative evidence of the
abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the elderly
person's or disabled adult's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a
substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm, in addition to
findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days before
the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this
subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written
statement of the content of the elderly person's or disabled adult's statement, the
time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement
which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full
disclosure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for
its ruling under this subsection.
9. The statute also covers statements by disabled adults. Id. This article only addresses the
statute as it pertains to the elderly.
10. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1999).
11. Conner v. State, 709 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
12. "Elderly person means a person sixty years of age or older who is suffering from the
infirmities of aging as manifested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physical,
mental, or emotional dysfunctioning, to the extent that the ability of the person to provide
adequately for the person's own care or protection is impaired." FLA. STAT. § 825.101(5) (2000).
13. Initial Br. for Pet. on the Merits at 5, Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999) (No.
92,835).
14. Id. at 2.
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Subsequent to this ruling, the defense made a motion to have the
Florida elderly hearsay exception declared unconstitutional.15 At a hear-
ing on the motion, Mr. Conner argued that the exception violated his
right to confrontation under both the United States and Florida Constitu-
tions.1 6 He also maintained that the statute was void for vagueness,
therefore denying him due process under both the state and federal con-
stitutions. 7 After hearing argument, the trial court disagreed and denied
the defense motion. 8 After this decision, Mr. Conner plead nolo con-
tendere to the charges. 9 He did, however, reserve the right to appeal the
constitutionality of the elderly hearsay exception."0 The parties agreed
that this issue was only dispositive as to two of the counts against Mr.
Conner-armed kidnapping and armed robbery.21
At Mr. Conner's appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal, the
court affirmed the trial court's ruling that section 90.803(24) was consti-
tutional. 22 The court found section 90.803(24) closely tracked the lan-
guage of a hearsay exception for children, section 90.803(23), Florida
Statutes,2 3 which had recently been upheld by the Florida Supreme
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2-3.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id.
19. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 953 (Fla. 1999).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 954.
22. Conner v. State, 709 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
23. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2000).
HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF CHILD VICTIM:
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which the
statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement
made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of
II or less describing any act of child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual abuse
against a child, the offense of child abuse, the offense of aggravated child abuse, or
any offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or penetration
performed in the presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child, not otherwise
admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability. In making its determination, the court may consider the mental and
physical age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or
offense, the relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertion,
the reliability of the child victim, and any factor deemed appropriate; and
2. The child either:
a. Testifies; or b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is corroborative
evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court
that the child's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial
likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s.
90.804( I).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days before
the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this
FLA. SUPREME COURT vs. U.S. SUPREME COURT
Court in State v. Townsend.24
The appellate court in Conner reasoned that if the language of sec-
tion 90.803(23), a hearsay exception for children in sexual and physical
abuse cases, could stand the test of confrontation and vagueness in a
manner satisfactory to the Florida Supreme Court, then so too could sec-
tion 90.803(24), the elderly exception .2  The Second District Court of
Appeal also noted that the same policy concerns inform both excep-
tions. 26 The court never reached the question of whether Mr. Ford's
statements themselves could be admitted, since the trial court never
decided that issue. In sum, the court found no "grave deficiencies" that
would call the elderly hearsay exception's constitutionality into ques-
tion.2 7 Mr. Conner then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.28
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower courts.29 In reaching
its decision, the court found that the statute lacked factors with which to
evaluate potentially admissible statements. 30 The court also found the
breadth of the statute invalidated its use.3 ' Additionally, it held that sec-
tion 90.803(24) violated a defendant's right to confrontation.3 2 Finally,
the court reasoned that this exception was different from section
90.803(23) because, unlike the appeals court, it found that the policy
interests present in the child hearsay context do not support a similar
exception for the elderly.33 In short, the court found that the exception
allowing hearsay by the elderly was facially unconstitutional.
34
In examining the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Conner, a
number of problematic questions arise as to the strength and basis for its
arguments. Part I of this Comment contrasts the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of Confrontation with that of the United States
Supreme Court. Part II looks at the Florida Supreme Court's call for
subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written
statement of the content of the child's statement, the time at which the statement
was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its
reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the
statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for
its ruling under this subsection.
24. 635 So. 2d 949, 960 (Fla. 1994).
25. See Conner, 709 So. 2d at 171-72.
26. Id. at 171 (Briefly describing the policy justifications for both exceptions).
27. Id. at 172.
28. Initial Br. for Pet. on the Merits at 4, Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 170, 950 (Fla. 1999)
(No. 92,835).
29. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).
30. Id. at 958-59.
31. Id. at 958.
32. Id. at 960.
33. Id. at 959-60.
34. Id. at 960.
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factors to evaluate elderly hearsay statements and its formulation of a
list to evaluate child statements in State v. Townsend. Part III examines
the breadth of the statute as compared with similar exceptions found in
other jurisdictions. Finally, Part IV looks at some of the policy reasons
that uphold the hearsay exception for children and their applicability in
the elderly context.
As this Comment demonstrates, the Florida Supreme Court misin-
terpreted and misconstrued the United States Supreme Court's cases
regarding confrontation and the admission of hearsay in the Conner v.
State decision. Basically, if the Florida Supreme Court is correct in its
reasoning about Florida's elderly hearsay exception, then there are both
federal laws and state laws being used in courts today which are
unconstitutional.
I. VIOLATION OF CONFRONTATION
The Florida Supreme Court invalidated section 90.803(24) because
it reasoned that the exception was "facially violative of the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation. 35
A. Federal "Confrontation" v. Florida "Confrontation"
Confrontation is considered to be one of the criminal defendant's
most fundamental rights. The Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees that the" . . . accused will enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him ... ."36 The Sixth Amend-
ment is guaranteed to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 Flor-
ida also has a Confrontation Clause within its own constitution. Article
I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution criminal defendants the right"
... to confront at trial adverse witnesses .... 38
While the wording of the state and federal clauses is somewhat dif-
ferent, their meaning has been considered the same. In its Florida Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence, the Florida Supreme Court has always
considered the state and federal clauses to be analogous, despite their
slight differences in wording. "The right of a defendant to confront his
or her accusers is a basic constitutional right protected by both the
United States and Florida constitutions. '39 The court always seems to
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
403-05 (1965)).
38. FLA. CONST. art., I § 16.
39. See, e.g., Baber v. State, 775 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2000); Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364
(Fla. 1998); Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1989).
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link the two together. There does not appear to be case law where the
court has found that the two clauses mean something different. Not only
has the Florida Supreme Court implicitly held that the two clauses guar-
antee the same right, the court has consistently used federal case law
when interpreting the right to confrontation in analyzing Florida cases.4"
In both Conner and Townsend, the Florida Supreme Court references a
number of United States Supreme Court decisions and uses the language
from those decisions to explain the rationale and basis for its opinions.4'
Since the Florida courts have deferred to the highest court's interpreta-
tion of confrontation, the rational conclusion is that the two clauses have
the same meaning. Therefore, if a statute being appealed for Confronta-
tion Clause violations passes muster according to the United States
Supreme Court, then it should correspondingly be constitutional accord-
ing to the Florida Supreme Court and vice versa.
B. Meaning of Confrontation
Because the Florida Supreme Court has recognized the parallel
between the federal guarantee of confrontation and Florida's guarantee,
the focus then shifts to how the United States Supreme Court interprets
confrontation and what this means in terms of section 90.803(24).
In its most strict interpretation, confrontation has been thought to
mean a defendant's right to face a witness and cross-examine him.42 In
Mattox v. United States, one of the earliest cases to interpret the Con-
frontation Clause of the United States Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court viewed the confrontation guarantee as a means of
preventing a defendant from being tried on the basis of depositions and
affidavits.4 3 It was thought that confrontation provided the opportunity
for the defendant to not only cross-examine the declarant, but also for
the witness to be put under oath and have his demeanor assessed by the
44
The United States Supreme Court, however, has not held that the
right to confrontation categorically prohibits the use of hearsay state-
ments that may violate the clause's literal terms.45 The Court has
viewed confrontation, like other provisions found within the Bill of
40. Id.
41. In both Conner and Townsend, the court cites Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), and
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), both of which are leading cases on how the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 954
(Fla. 1999); State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 956 (Fla. 1994).
42. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
43. 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
44. Id.
45. Wright, 497 U.S. at 813.
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Rights, as subject to exceptions.46 The court explained, in Mattox, that,
"the law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the public shall not be
wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to
the accused."47 While literal confrontation is the preferred means for
admitting testimony,48 there may be competing interests that warrant
dispensing with literal confrontation at trial.49 Hearsay exceptions have
long been considered examples of statements that are sometimes
immune from exclusion by the right to confrontation. The Confronta-
tion Clause acts as the check on which hearsay may be admissible.5 °
According to the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, the Confrontation
Clause restricts what is considered admissible hearsay.5
The language in Roberts seems to require two different showings
by the party wishing to introduce hearsay: necessity and trustworthi-
ness. In Roberts, the focus was placed on whether the declarant was
available at trial when deciding whether her hearsay would be admissi-
ble. 53 The original reason for requiring a showing of unavailability was
to emphasize the preference for face-to-face confrontation. 4 The
requirement that a declarant be unavailable to allow the presentation of
hearsay evidence has since eroded.5 5 In White v. Illinois,56 a case in
which a child had been sexually assaulted, the Supreme Court revisited
the availability issue from Roberts and announced that the unavailability
requirement was only a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause
inquiry when the statements to be introduced were from an earlier court
proceeding.57 Since White, a showing of unavailability is only required
when the out-of-court statement attempting to be introduced was made
in the course of a prior judicial proceeding. 8 Therefore, the Supreme
Court's primary focus in analyzing hearsay in terms of the Confrontation
46. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
47. Id.
48. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970).
49. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
50. Id. at 65.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 66. "... [W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable." Id.
54. Id. at 65.
55. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 contains twenty-three exceptions where the showing of
unavailability is not relevant, and this pertains to well-established exceptions like business
records, dying declarations, and excited utterances. FED. R. EvID. 803.
56. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
57. Id. at 354.
58. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 1724-25 (5th ed.
2000).
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Clause is on the trustworthiness of the statement. The availability of the
declarant is almost always immaterial.
Thus, this second requirement stated in Roberts, the reliability
determination, now forms the core of the federal confrontation doctrine.
Under Roberts, a declarant's out-of-court statements, where that declar-
ant is not testifying at trial under oath subject to cross-examination, must
be shown to be so trustworthy that the statements can be regarded as
accurate even without the adversarial testing of in-court cross-examina-
tion.59 The statements must contain sufficient "indicia of reliability"
such that there is no real difference between admitting the hearsay state-
ments without the declarant and evaluating the declarant's statement
during cross-examination.
60
The underlying rationale for the indicia of reliability notion stems
from the theory that the circumstances surrounding certain types of
statements are equivalent or superior mechanisms by which to guarantee
trustworthiness than is the process of cross-examination. The Court
looked to the fact that there were already well-established common law
exceptions to the rule against hearsay that were thought to guarantee the
same protections that the Confrontation Clause is supposed to guard
against.6' Thus, these "indicia of reliability" can be inferred when "evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 62 Such firmly
rooted exceptions are considered to be those like dying declarations
63
and excited utterances.64 It is thought that the circumstances under
which such statements are made guard against the risk of fabrication.65
Statements, however, that do not fall into those long-accepted
exceptions are presumptively unreliable.66 Accordingly, these state-
ments must be excluded".., absent a showing of particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. 67 Since Florida's elderly hearsay exception is





63. Dying declarations are classic hearsay-they are rarely made in the presence of the
defendant, they do not provide an opportunity for cross-examination, and the witness is not
brought before the jury. However, "from time immemorial they have been treated as competent
testimony." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
64. A statement that is made in an excited state is made without the chance to reflect on what
the consequences of one's exclamation may be has indicia of reliability greater than a statement
made in the relative calm of the courtroom. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 347 (1992).
65. "[T]he sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and
to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath." Mattox, 156 U.S.
at 244.
66. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990).
67. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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tively guarantee reliability, it falls into this latter category requiring a
specific showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 68
When dealing with statements falling outside a firmly rooted
exception, these particularized guarantees of trustworthiness are easier
to find in some cases than others. In Ohio v. Roberts, the daughter of the
victim was called by the defense at a preliminary hearing regarding for-
gery and stolen credit card charges.6 9 During her questioning by the
defense, she did not admit giving Roberts, the defendant, the credit cards
and check at issue without telling him that she did not have permission
to use them.70 At the subsequent trial, the daughter could not be pro-
duced despite numerous attempts by the state to procure her appear-
ance.7 As a substitute, the prosecution sought to introduce her
testimony from the preliminary hearing.72 While the trial court admitted
her statements, both the appellate court and the Ohio Supreme Court
took issue with the statements' admissibility and reversed the trial
court's decision.73 The United States Supreme Court, however, said that
because the witness was unavailable and her prior testimony possessed
sufficient "indicia of reliability," her statements could come in without
violating the defendant's right to confrontation.74 Because the witness
was under oath and the defendant's attorney was able to cross-examine
the witness, the testimony was deemed sufficiently reliable.75
Courts are often faced with this question of whether to admit for-
mer testimony when the witness is unavailable at the time of trial. This
is an area of considerable debate because there is a hearsay exception
under Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that allows for-
mer testimony to be admitted when the declarant is unavailable and the
party against whom the testimony is now being offered had an opportu-
nity and motive to develop that testimony by direct or cross-examina-
tion.76 There are often situations, however, where the prosecution seeks
68. Without section 90.803(24), there would have been no way to admit statements by an
elderly person, to a police officer, since it does not fall into any of the traditional hearsay
exceptions. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 956 (Fla. 1999).
69. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 59.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 60-61.
74. Id. at 77.
75. Id. at 73.
76. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as
a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with the law in the
course of the same or another proceeding if the party against whom the testimony is
[Vol. 55:583
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to introduce testimony that does not satisfy the requirements of Rule
804(b)(1). For example, grand jury testimony, which is sometimes
allowed in at trial, is never subject to cross-examination but has still
been considered "sufficiently trustworthy."77 When testimony such as
this is outside the "firmly rooted" former testimony exception, the grand
jury testimony must be introduced through some other exception.
Courts usually turn to Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the residual hear-
say exception.78
Rule 807 allows the use of statements at trial that have equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness, when compared to other established
exceptions. While it may seem as though this Rule would make a lot of
testimony admissible, it was specifically established with the intention
that it be used "very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. 79
This Rule was created to allow reliable statements to come in when they
arise from unanticipated situations that demonstrate a degree of trust-
worthiness equal to that found in specifically stated hearsay excep-
tions.80 The idea behind this exception was that rather than artificially
expand and consequently erode the effectiveness of the other exceptions,
this catch-all exception could be used as necessity dictates.81 Addition-
ally, Rule 807 is considered to facilitate ascertainment of the truth and
the fair adjudication of controversies, which are the basic functions of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.82
Rule 807 requires that the statement be material, that its probative
value outweigh that of any other evidence that could be reasonably pro-
now offered, or, in a civil action of proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. McHan,
101 F.3d 1027 (4th Cir. 1996).
78. FED. R. EvID. 807 provides:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
79. GRAHAM, supra note 58, at 2071 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974) reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7058).
80. Id. at 2069-70 (citing FED. R. EvID. 807 advisory committee's note).
81. Id. at 2075.
82. United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1048 (1st Cir. 1997).
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cured, and that its admission is in accord with the general purposes of
the rules and in the interests of justice.83 Since Rule 807 does not fall
into the automatic indicia of reliability category because it is not a firmly
rooted exception, the federal courts require that statements offered under
this exception be shown to have particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.
In United States v. Papajohn, a federal district court was faced with
the question of whether to admit the grand jury testimony of a witness
who implicated the defendant on three separate occasions before the
grand jury.84 The defendant allegedly burned down her convenience
store in order to collect the insurance proceeds and was facing arson,
mail fraud, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy charges.85 The witness,
the defendant's son, had made one statement before the grand jury indi-
cating that the defendant had burned down the store to get the insurance
money.86 The Eighth Circuit had to decide, since the son was unavaila-
ble to testify at trial, if the grand jury testimony was so reliable that in-
court testimony would add little to the veracity of the statement.
While the son in Papajohn was under oath, as all grand jury wit-
nesses are, there is a general problem with admitting grand jury testi-
mony, namely, that the witness is not subject to cross-examination.87
Cross-examination is considered to help test the reliability of the state-
ment and to help bolster a showing of particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness.88 Another problem with admitting statements like those in
Papajohn, is that they may be attempts to minimize the declarant's cul-
pability in the alleged crime.89 There may have been a question as to
whether the declarant, the defendant's son, was somehow involved.
Even statements in which the declarant inculpates himself are not per se
reliable, and the statement by the son in Papajohn was presumably less
SO.
90
Yet, the court in Papajohn still allowed the use at trial of the
declarant's grand jury testimony. 9' The court relied on the fact that the
son was under oath, present before the grand jury, and responding to
open-ended questions as indications that the statements were reliable.92
83. United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1977).
84. 212 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).
85. Id. at 1115-16.
86. Id. at 1116.
87. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1997).
88. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
89. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 132 (1999).
90. See id. at 125.
91. Papajohn, 212 F.3d at 1120.
92. Id.
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Furthermore, the court pointed out that the witness was not in police
custody nor was he charged with the crime.93 The court felt because he
was just voluntarily answering the government's questions, the conclu-
sion could be drawn that the statements were inherently reliable.94
Papajohn is not unique. There are many courts that have allowed the
presentation of statements made before grand juries by witnesses who
later become unavailable to testify at trial.95
Federal courts have been faced with more difficult applications of
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." One such intricacy in the
application of this notion comes in the form of statements in child abuse
cases where there is no oath, no grand jury, and no cross-examination of
any kind. The federal system does not have a specific exception for
statements by children in this context, as Florida does in section
90.803(23). Therefore, such statements, if admitted, must come in under
Rule 807.96
In United States v. Cree, the government sought to use the residual
exception to introduce statements of a four-year-old assault victim.97
The defendant was convicted after the trial court had admitted the
child's statements. The defendant appealed contending a violation of
her confrontation rights because the statements lacked the required
showing of trustworthiness.98 The Eighth Circuit disagreed and found
that the statements were sufficiently credible.99 The court looked at the
child's age and his reaction to being shown the items used in the abuse,
as well as the corroborating evidence as factors for finding the state-
ments to be sufficiently reliable."° The court noted that while the catch-
all exception should be limited to exceptional circumstances, "it is hard
to imagine many cases more compelling than this case."' 0'
The court in Cree, as in Papajohn, had to rely upon factors other
than previous cross-examination to make a finding of trustworthiness.
The courts, however, were able to examine the record and make the
determination that the statements could be admitted without violating a
defendant's right to confrontation. 1°2 Thus the federal courts have con-
93. Id. at 1119-20.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796 (8th
Cir. 1997).
96. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
97. 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 478.
99. Id. at 476.
100. The Eight Circuit also felt the interests of justice were served by admitting the challenged
statements. Id. at 477-78.
101. Id. at 478.
102. Id.
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sistently held that when a statement fulfills the "indicia of reliability"
requirement-either through a firmly rooted exception or a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness-the right of confrontation
is still protected.
C. Confrontation and Section 90.803(24)
The Florida Supreme Court in Conner discusses the meaning of
confrontation, in similar terms as described above, and cites many of the
same United States Supreme Court cases, but concludes that section
90.803(24) violates a defendant's right to confrontation. Looking at the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of confrontation and the
requirements of section 90.803(24), it is difficult to see how the Florida
Supreme Court arrived at its conclusion.
Most importantly, section 90.803(24) requires an "indicia of relia-
bility" showing. Since the statute does not fall under a firmly rooted
exception, 10 3 statements coming in under the exception must possess
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to be in accord with con-
frontation. Section 90.803(24) has a number of safeguards built in to
satisfy this trustworthiness requirement.
First, the source of the information, the method, or the circum-
stances cannot show a lack trustworthiness."° Once this threshold trust-
worthiness is shown, the court must conduct a hearing outside the
presence of the jury to assess whether the time, content, and circum-
stances of the statement provide assurances of reliability.'05 The statute
further outlines factors for the court to consider and requires specific
findings to be put on the record as the basis for the court's ruling.1
0 6
Finally, the statute puts the burden on the prosecution in criminal
actions, as part of the notice requirement, to provide a basis for the state-
ment's admissibility. 17 This includes a showing that the circumstances
surrounding the statement indicate its reliability.'0 8
Section 90.803(24) even goes back to the original language of Rob-
erts and emphasizes the preference for face-to-face confrontation by
requiring a showing of necessity. 0 9 The elderly hearsay exception, in
section 90.803(24)(a)(2), requires that the declarant either testify or be
shown to be unavailable." 0 Clearly, section 90.803(24) requires that
103. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 956 (Fla. 1999) (1999).
104. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a) (1999).
105. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1) (1999).
106. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1) & § 90.803(24)(c) (1999).
107. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(b) (1999).
108. Id.
109. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
110. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(2) (1999). The statute states:
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statements admitted under its guise be both necessary and possess partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness in strict conformance with the
United States Supreme Court's confrontation doctrine.
Despite the employment of such procedural safeguards, the Florida
Supreme Court contends that the statute is not in conformity with the
guarantees of confrontation. This seems like quite a stretch. The statute
seems calculated to adhere to the requirements set forth by the United
States Supreme Court to guarantee trustworthiness, yet the Florida
Supreme Court still rejects section 90.803(24) as violating a defendant's
right to confrontation. In so holding, it seems the Florida Supreme
Court either misconstrues the United States Supreme Court's hearsay
exception jurisprudence, or interprets confrontation differently than the
United States Supreme Court intended.
II. THE TOWNSEND DECISION AND THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO EVALUATE
About five years before the Florida Supreme Court decided Con-
ner, it considered State v. Townsend.II' At issue in Townsend was the
constitutionality of section 90.803(23), the analogue to the elderly hear-
say exception in the child abuse context.!
12
Jack Timothy Townsend was on trial for sexual battery of his two-
year-old daughter. 13 Mr. Townsend's daughter could not testify at trial
because her age rendered her incompetent.114 Therefore, the state intro-
duced the little girl's statements to a number of people made in the year
following the alleged abuse pursuant to section 90.803(23). 5 The girl's
mother, a doctor, and a psychiatrist all testified to the two-year-old's
statements about the abuse. 16 Mr. Townsend was convicted and
appealed the decision contending that a number of the statements admit-
ted at trial were violative of his right to confrontation.
1 17
[I]n conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment
establishes a rule of necessity. The elderly person or disabled adult either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is corroborative evidence of the
abuse of offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the elderly
person's or disabled adult's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a
substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm, in addition to
findings pursuant to S. 90.804(1).
111. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
112. Section 90.803(24) "closely tracks" section 90.803(23). Conner v. State, 709 So. 2d 170,
171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
113. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 952.
114. Id.
115. Supra note 23 and the accompanying text.
116. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 952-53.
117. Id. at 956. The court reaffirmed its decision in Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988),
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The Florida Supreme Court disagreed. While the court remanded
the case for further proceedings, it did uphold section 90.803(23) as con-
stitutional.11 8 The Florida Supreme Court analyzed the numerous safe-
guards built into the statute and found these to be sufficient protections
of the defendant's rights when properly applied." 9 The court high-
lighted the statute's requirement that the trial court conduct a hearing to
examine the circumstances surrounding the statement to determine its
reliability. 
120
In its discussion of the hearing, the Florida Supreme Court paid
particular attention to the factors the statute outlines for making the reli-
ability determination. It quoted section 90.803(23)(a)(1): "[T]he court
may consider the mental and physical age and maturity of the child, the
nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child
to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the child
victim, and any other factor deemed appropriate."'
2
1
The court went on in Townsend to give a list of factors that a trial
court should also consider in determining the reliability of statements in
the child abuse context. It says these other factors should include:
... [T]he statement's spontaneity; whether the statement was made at
the first available opportunity following the alleged incident; whether
the statement was elicited in response to questions from adults; the
mental state of the child when the abuse was reported; whether the
statement consisted of a child-like description of the act, whether the
child used terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; the
motive or lack thereof to fabricate the statement, the ability of the
child to distinguish between reality and fantasy; the vagueness of the
accusations; the possibility of any improper influence on the child by
participants involved in a domestic dispute; and contradictions in the
accusation. 122
The court in Townsend seemed very concerned with the guidance given
to trial courts in order to assess the reliability of statements.
in which it held that section 90.803(23) comported with confrontation as outlined by the United
States Supreme Court.
118. Id. at 952.
119. Id. at 958. The court found the trial court in Townsend had made insufficient
determinations as to the reliability of the hearsay statements admitted at trial and required further
findings to comply with the requirements of section 90.803(23). This case was an example of
how a court failed to properly implement the safeguards, but, the court believed when properly
applied, such protections could guarantee the reliability of the statements.
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A. The Absence of Factors in Conner
The Florida Supreme Court's discussion of the statute's hearing
requirement, its list of factors as discussed in Townsend, and the suffi-
ciency of those factors is interesting in light of the fact that section
90.803(24) has all the same requirements. Section 90.803(24)(a)(1) pro-
vides that:
[Tihe court may consider the mental and physical age and maturity of
the elderly person or disabled adult, the nature and duration of the
abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to the offender, the
reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the elderly person or dis-
abled adult, and any factor deemed appropriate.
123
Like section 90.803(23), section 90.803(24) mandates that the court
conduct a hearing to examine the circumstances of the statement sought
to be admitted. At the hearing in Conner, the court ruled that the statute
applied to Mr. Ford, but reserved ruling on the reliability of his state-
ments. It is puzzling that the hearing to analyze a list of factors, which
is deemed satisfactory by the Florida Supreme Court in child abuse con-
text, can be deemed to be insufficient when the declarant's age simply
increases. Despite the similarity in statutory language, the Conner court
opined, "[u]nlike the child hearsay context, these factors do not guaran-
tee the reliability of a statement when applied to an elderly adult."
1 24
The task facing the Florida Supreme Court in Conner was the for-
mulation of a list of factors indicating the reliability of statements by the
elderly as it had done in Townsend for the exception for children's state-
ments. The court failed to formulate such a list explaining, "[u]nlike the
child hearsay context, we are unable to formulate a list of permissible
considerations that would ensure the reliability of a hearsay statement
made by an elderly adult to the extent that 'adversarial testing would add
little to its reliability.' "125
In Conner, the court felt that because it could not provide the trial
courts with additional factors to use to assess reliability, the statute
could not be properly applied. It felt that the statutory factors included
in section 90.803(24) were not enough. Without a supplemental list of
considerations, the Florida Supreme Court felt it had to deem section
90.803(24) unconstitutional.
126
In Townsend, the court strives to ensure that trial courts evaluate
the whole picture when assessing hearsay statements. 127 It concludes its
123. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24) (1995).
124. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 958 (Fla. 1999).
125. Id. at 958-59 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990)).
126. Id.
127. State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 958 (Fla. 1994).
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list of factors with the instruction that courts should use "a totality of the
circumstances evaluation in determining reliability."' 28 In Conner, how-
ever, the court was unable to come up with this inventory of factors to
assess the totality of circumstances and used this as part of its basis for
concluding that the statute is unconstitutional.
The court gets this "totality of the circumstances" language from
the United States Supreme Court's language in Idaho v. Wright, which it
cites to this end.'29 "In sum, as noted by the United States Supreme
Court in Wright, a court is to use a totality of circumstances evaluation
in determining reliability."' 3 ° It seems as though the Florida Supreme
Court may be citing Wright for a proposition different from its holding.
B. Wright's Perspective on Formulating a List of Factors
Wright is one of the Supreme Court's leading cases dealing with
making determinations on the reliability of hearsay statements for
admissibility at trial. At issue in Wright were statements made to a pedi-
atrician by a three-year-old victim of sexual abuse.' 3 ' The state sought
to introduce the little girl's statements because she was unavailable to
testify at trial. 32 The trial court allowed the use of the child's state-
ments pursuant to Idaho's residual hearsay exception, which allows the
presentation of statements that do not fall within other hearsay excep-
tions but which have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness." 
33
The United States Supreme Court's review of Wright focused on
how to determine when a statement is sufficiently reliable to allow its
admission. 34 The Court declined to list specific factors to be consid-
128. Id.
129. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
130. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 958.
131. Wright, 497 U.S. at 809.
132. These facts are similar to those in Townsend. See Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 951.
133. IDAHo R. EVID. 803(24) (1990). Idaho's residential hearsay exception is modeled closely
after Federal Rules of Evidence 807. The exception provides:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance
of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
134. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816.
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ered, explaining, "[w]e do not believe the Constitution imposes a fixed
set of procedural prerequisites to the admission of such statements at
trial." '135 The Court stated that the proper focus of a reliability inquiry
should be on the circumstances surrounding the initial utterance of the
statement in question and on any facts that appear to make the declarant
worthy of belief. 36 In refusing to set forth a specific test, the Court
chose instead to rely on the original rationale underlying all hearsay
exceptions.
Hearsay is allowed when "the declarant's truthfulness is so clear
from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination
would be of marginal utility. ' 137 Therefore, as long as a court imple-
ments a test that shows a statement is so trustworthy that cross-examina-
tion is unnecessary, there are sufficient safeguards under the Court's
rationale. The only real guidance the Court provides is to suggest that
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness "must be shown from the
totality of the circumstances but we think the relevant circumstances
include only those that surround the making of the statement and that
render the declarant particularly worthy of belief."' 38
The United States Supreme Court, however, does not contend that
there are no factors that a court can consider to determine the reliability
of statements in looking at the totality of the circumstances. It simply
does not think that there are hard and fast features that every court
should be forced to consider. "[C]ourts have considerable leeway in
their consideration of appropriate factors. We therefore decline to
endorse a mechanical test ... ",'3
In light of the flexible approach taken by the Court in Wright, it is
difficult to reconcile the Florida Supreme Court's rigid requirement of a
list of reliability factors in Conner. This contradiction becomes particu-
larly problematic in light of the fact that the need for factors was part of
the Florida Supreme Court's basis for overturning section 90.803(24).
Here again, the Florida Supreme Court is at odds with long established
principles of the United States Supreme Court.
C. Factors in a Physical Abuse Context
It is also difficult to understand the Florida Supreme Court's list of
factors for section 90.803(23) in light of the fact that the statute applies
to both child sexual and physical abuse cases. The court basically
135. Id. at 818.
136. Id. at 819.
137. Id. at 820.
138. Id. at 819.
139. Id. at 822.
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imposes additional considerations that trial courts must undertake when
ruling on the admissibility of statements in child abuse cases. While
their suggested factors, like the child's use of terminology unexpected of
a child of a similar age, may prove valuable in a sexual abuse context, it
is hard to see how their list will prove effective in terms of physical
abuse. The factors outlined would not prove helpful to show "indicia of
reliability" in physical abuse cases. For example, in addition to the fac-
tors enumerated in section 90.803(23),140 the court in Townsend added
several factors that a court should consider in the child sexual and physi-
cal abuse context, namely:
[w]hether the statement was made at the first available opportunity
following the alleged incident; whether the statement was elicited in
response to questions from adults; the mental state of the child when
the abuse was reported; whether the statement consisted of a child-
like description of the act; whether the child used terminology unex-
pected of a child of similar age; the motive or lack thereof to fabri-
cate the statement; the ability of the child to distinguish between
reality and fantasy; the vagueness of the accusations; the possibility
of any improper influence on the child by participants involved in a
domestic dispute; and contradictions in the accusation.' 41
The court's language belies the presumption that when a child describes
certain kinds of sexual acts, there is inherent trustworthiness in his or her
statements. For example, when a three-year-old child begins describing
ejaculation, the statement is inherently trustworthy.
Yet, the same cannot be said for statements describing physical
abuse. There is no real terminology that will reveal the trustworthiness
of a statement made by a child who has been hit or otherwise physically
battered. For example, if a ten-year-old boy uses child-like language in
describing alleged abuse at the hands of his father just after the alleged
incident, there are not sufficient assurance that the boy has not made up
the story as a reaction to having been grounded or that the boy is not
being coached by a parent seeking custody.
Although Townsend was not a physical abuse case, the Florida
Supreme Court seemed to ignore the problem physical abuse cases pose
in its decision. The additional factors the Florida Supreme Court enu-
merated in Townsend, listed above, do not assure reliability outside the
child sexual abuse context. While it is unlikely that any kind of hard
and fast list could guarantee trustworthiness in physical abuse cases, it is
unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to treat section 90.803(23)
factors as a benchmark of reliability when those factors are only in fact
140. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2000).
141. Townsend, 748 So. 2d at 957-58.
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reliable for a portion of child abuse cases. That the section 90.803(24)
exception for the elderly does not easily lend itself to the formulation of
a convenient list of factors should not automatically render the exception
unconstitutional.
The challenge as to how to "guarantee" reliability in terms of state-
ments by the elderly goes to the heart of the court's argument against
section 90.803(24) in Conner. The court is correct in that it is difficult
to formulate a list of factors that would ensure that an elderly person is
being truthful in his accusations of abuse or neglect. Suggestions have
even been made to rewrite the elderly exception to include such a list to
satisfy the Florida Supreme Court. 142 Yet like the child physical abuse
142. Meredith E. James, Note, Narrowing the Gap Between Florida's Hearsay Exceptions for
Child Declarants and Elderly Declarants: Sections 90.803(23) and 90.803(24), Florida Statutes,
55 U. MiA i. L. REV. 309, 338-39 (2000). This article includes a proposed revision of 90.803(24)
to read with changes indicated in italics to read:
(24) HEARSAY EXCEPTION: STATEMENT OF ELDERLY PERSON.
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which the
statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement
made by an elderly person, as defined in subsection (d), describing any act of abuse
or neglect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery or aggravated battery or
assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery on the declarant elderly person, not
otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding
if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability. In making its determination, the court must consider the mental and
physical age and maturity of the elderly person the nature and duration of the abuse
or offense, the relationship of the victim to the offender, the reliability of the
assertion, the reliability of the elderly person, and
2. The elderly person either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided there is corroborative evidence of the abuse
or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the elderly
person's participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial
likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, or that the elderly person has a
physical handicap which prevents them from being transported to court to testify, in
addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days before the trial that
a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this subsection will be offered as
evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written statement of the content of the elderly
person's statement, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the
statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full
disclosure of the statement.
The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling
under this subsection.
As pertains to this statute, an elderly person is one over the age of 65 who is suffering from
the infirmities of aging as manifested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physical,
mental, or emotional impairment, to the extent that the ability to provide for his own care or
protection may be impaired, but not to the extent that one's ability to perceive events and to
process and relay information is adversely affected.
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cases, even these other considerations do not guarantee reliability.
Even these efforts, however, ignore the United States Supreme
Court's emphasis on the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
choosing instead to focus on the factors leading to a finding of trustwor-
thiness. 143 The United States Supreme Court stresses the need for an ad
hoc determination. A proclamation of a list of factors could hinder,
rather than promote the ad hoc analysis required by the United States
Supreme Court.
Clearly, formulating a list of factors is difficult in terms of the eld-
erly, as well as physically abused children, but the United States
Supreme Court has decided that a court should apply whatever factors it
deems appropriate. Apparently, the Florida Supreme Court disagrees.'"
Once again, the Florida Supreme Court seems to disregard the mandate
of the highest court in setting out Florida's laws.
III. SCOPE OF SECTION 90.803(24)
Another reason cited by the Florida Supreme Court in striking
down section 90.803(24) was overbreadth.145 The statute allows presen-
tation of statements by elderly persons describing acts of "abuse or neg-
lect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery or aggravated battery
or assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery, or any other violent
act."146
The court in Conner first remarks that "the reach of the statute is
far broader than the child hearsay exception."' 47 While section
90.803(23) is limited to children under age eleven who are victims of
physical and sexual abuse, 4 8 section 90.803(24) applies to elderly adults
who satisfy the requirements of section 825.101(5), Florida Statutes,
and who are victims of "any act of abuse or neglect, any act of exploita-
tion, the offense of battery or aggravated battery or aggravated assault or
sexual battery, or any other violent act .. . . 149 The court seemed con-
cerned that the elderly hearsay exception applied to a array of crimes as
well as to a broadly defined class of citizens.
50
143. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
144. See infra Section II.
145. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 959-60 (Fla. 1999).
146. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1) (1999).
147. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 959.
148. See supra note 23.
149. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a) (1999).
150. The statute applies to "elderly persons" as defined in FLA. STAT. § 825.101(5) (2000).
See supra note 12 for the exact language of the definition.
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A. Florida's Exception and the Federal Exception
Once again, the Florida Supreme Court's decision seems to be at
odds with United States Supreme Court's decisions. While the United
States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether a statute
admitting statements by the elderly is too broad, 5 ' it has consistently
reviewed Federal Rule of Evidence 807 and its predecessors, Federal
Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5).1
52
Rule 807, the "residual exception," allows the use of statements not
falling under one of the other outlined exceptions but having equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness. 53 It requires a showing of: (1) circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) materiality; (3) probative
value; (4) the interest of justice; and (5) notice.
54
Nowhere in the statute is there a limitation as to the crimes to
which it is applicable. 5 Rule 807 operates in the following manner:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not
excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement
is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention
to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.' 56
Since it has no restrictions, Rule 807 has been used to admit state-
ments in a wide range of cases. In United States v. Santos, Rule 807 was
used to admit statements about campaign activities to prove fraud and
extortion after the statements were found to be material, probative, and
reliable. 57 In United States v. Ellis, a social worker, who had examined
151. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on Conner on June 26, 2000. Florida
v. Conner, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (1999).
152. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5) were combined to form Rule 807.
153. FED. R. EVID. 807.
154. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1110 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Moffett v. McCauley,
724 F.2d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 1984)).
155. However, Congress did state that it intended for the exception to be used "rarely, and only
in exceptional circumstances." GRAHAM, supra note 58 at 2075 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1277
(2000) reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7058.
156. FED. R. EvID. 807.
157. 65 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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a child for signs of abuse, was allowed to testify under the residual
exception about the remarks and gestures of a two-year-old child made
while playing with anatomically-correct dolls to prove the occurrence of
sexual abuse.' 58 In United States v. Cree, the residual exception was
also used to admit statements made to a social worker and a government
worker by a four-year-old boy about how his injuries occurred. 159 This
statute has no limit in scope as far as the crimes for which it can be used,
yet it is still constitutional according to the United States Supreme
Court.
Not only does Rule 807 not limit the charges it can be used to
prove, it also has no restriction as to the declarants to which it applies. It
has been used in cases like United States v. Barbati in which the court
allowed references to a barmaid's pointing out counterfeiters at the
scene of the crime, even though the woman could not remember the
faces of the perpetrators at the time of trial.'6 ° Rule 807 has been used
to try and introduce the statements made to a neighbor by a man who
had just been burned by his exploding hot water heater in Parsons v.
Honeywell, Inc.'6 ' Even statements by nine-year-old victims of sexual
assault made to an FBI agent were allowed in under the residual excep-
tion in United States v. Groom. 62 The age or condition of the declarant
has no bearing on the operation of Rule 807.
Given the United States Supreme Court's approval of a hearsay
exception that is not limited to any category of charge or declarant, the
Florida Supreme Court's reasoning behind its rejection of section
90.803(24) seems attenuated at best. Florida Statute section 90.803(24)
is considerably more limited than Rule 807, yet the Florida Supreme
Court has rejected section 90.803(24) as too broad. After Conner, it
would seem that the Florida Supreme Court, given the chance, would
also reject Rule 807 as too broad and therefore unconstitutional. In light
of the United States Supreme Court never having taken issue with Rule
807's breadth, Florida's position appears strained.
Furthermore, section 90.803(24) seems to have most of the same
procedural safeguards built directly in to the language of the statute that
the federal courts have recognized within their Rule 807 case law. Both
158. 935 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1991) (statements were admitted under former Rule 803(24) which
has subsequently become Rule 807).
159. 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1985) (statements came in under former Rule 803(24) which has
been recodified as Rule 807).
160. 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (admitting statements pursuant to former Rule 803(24)
which has been recodified as Rule 807).
161. 929 F.2d 901, 908 (2d Cir. 1991) (the court found the statement was not as probative as
other potential evidence and thus would not allow the statements in under the residual exception).
162. 978 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1992) (allowing statements in under former Rule 803(24) which is
now Rule 807).
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compel a showing of reliability and notice. 163 In addition to these pro-
tections of the defendant's rights, the Florida statute also requires spe-
cific findings as to the victim's age and as to the type of crime involved.
It would seem that these additional restrictions provide an even greater
measure of security to the defendant's rights by excluding even more
hearsay. Yet, the Florida Supreme Court focuses on the fact that the
elderly hearsay exception applies in a broader context than does the
child hearsay exception in ruling section 90.803(24) unconstitutional. 6
If the Florida Supreme Court is right, the United States Supreme Court
must be wrong in holding Rule 807 constitutional, for the two positions
cannot be reconciled.
B. Florida's Exception and Other States' Exceptions
It is also interesting to note that the federal courts are not alone in
their use of an unlimited residual hearsay exception. While the Florida
legislature has declined to enact such an exception, a number of jurisdic-
tions have enacted exceptions similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
807. 165
Georgia has enacted what has been termed the necessity exception,
which requires much of the same showing that Rule 807 does. 166 Geor-
gia's exception, section 24-3-1 states, "Hearsay evidence defined; when
admitted. (a) Hearsay is that which does not derive its value solely from
the credit of the witness but rests mainly on the veracity and competency
of other persons. (b) Hearsay evidence is admitted only in specified
cases from necessity."'' 67 Under Georgia's exception, statements have
been admitted to prove various facts in a case ranging from a defen-
dant's gang association1 68 to threats made to a victim.' 69
In Ward v. State, such threats to a victim were deemed admissi-
163. While section 90.803(24) does not expressly require showing of materiality, probative
value, or interests of justice, such requirements indirectly apply through section 90.403, Florida
Statutes (2000). Section 90.403 requires that relevant evidence be inadmissible if its probative
value is outweighed by prejudice. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2000).
164. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 958 (Fla. 1999).
165. CoLo. R. EVID. 807; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-1(b) (1999); IDAHO R. EVID. 803(24),
804(b)(5); IOWA R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); Miss. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-803(23) (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-803(x), 11-804(b)(5) (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) (2000); R.I. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 908.045(6)
(2000).
166. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-1(b) (2000).
167. While Georgia's exception seems somewhat vague, it has been interpreted to mean that
when the hearsay declarant is unavailable and the circumstances under which the statement was
made show its trustworthiness, that the statement can be admitted. See Shavers v. State, 406
S.E.2d 803 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
168. Clark v. State, 515 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 1999).
169. Ward v. State, 520 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. 1999).
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ble. 7° The defendant was convicted of assault and felony murder after
having run over the victim, his live-in girlfriend. 7' The trial court had
admitted statements made by the deceased prior to her death to friends
that she was afraid for her life. The defendant appealed their admissibil-
ity. The Georgia Supreme Court employed a two-prong test, similar to
the inquiry used by United States Supreme Court, to the statements at
issue. 172 Having found that the statements were necessary, since the vic-
tim was deceased, and that the circumstances surrounding the statements
tended to verify their reliability, the court upheld the statements' admis-
sibility and the defendant's conviction. 1
73
Nowhere in its discussion of the exception or the statements admis-
sibility did the court in Ward even mention the scope of the statute. In
fact, the Georgia statute is much more vague and broad than Florida's
section 90.803(24), yet the Georgia Supreme Court has upheld section
24-3-1. The Georgia Supreme Court, unlike the Florida Supreme Court,
seems to be in accord with the United States Supreme Court.
Colorado courts have also used its residual hearsay exception to
admit trustworthy testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible
because of the traditional rules against hearsay. Like Federal Rule of
Evidence 807 and Georgia's section 24-3-1, Colorado's catch all excep-
tion, Colorado Rule of Evidence 807 provides:
A statement not specifically covered by any Rule 803 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines (A) the statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. How-
ever, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant. '4
Colorado's exception was used to admit statements by a child vic-
tim of sexual assault and aggravated incest in People v. Diefenderfer.
175
The three-year-old victim made statements to a number of individuals,
170. Id. at 208.
171. Id. at 207.
172. Id. at 208.
173. Id. at 209, 211.
174. CoLo. R. EvID. 807.
175. 784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1990).
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including an investigator for the district attorney, about the sexual abuse
she suffered at the hands of her stepfather. 17 6 Because of the potential
trauma that testifying could pose for the little girl, the court deemed her
unavailable and the state subsequently sought to introduce her hearsay
statements to the investigator.'77 The trial court admitted the statements
and the defendant was convicted. 7 8 He appealed, contending that his
right to confrontation had been violated by the admission of the
statements. 1
79
While the Colorado Supreme Court found the statements should
have been admitted under Colorado's specific exception for children in
sex abuse cases,' 80 the court nonetheless found that the statements satis-
fied the reliability requirements of Colorado Rule of Evidence
804(b)(5)."8 ' Here again, a court is upholding and implementing a
residual exception, which has no specific requirements as to a category
of declarants that it applies to. Like the United States Supreme Court
and the Georgia Supreme Court, the Colorado Supreme Court took no
issue with the scope of the residual hearsay exception.
There are many other cases in states across the country in which
state courts have ruled on the admissibility of evidence under a residual
hearsay exception.182 While these courts sometimes question the trial
court's finding of reliability, the breadth of these statutes has never been
called into question. In that arena, the Florida Supreme Court stands
alone.
C. Florida's Exception and the California Exception
Florida is not the only state to have enacted a hearsay exception to
protect statements made by the elderly. California Evidence Code sec-
tion 1380 provides:
Elder and dependent adults; statements by victims of abuse (a) In a
criminal proceeding charging a violation, or attempted violation, of
Section 368 of the Penal Code, evidence of a statement made by a
declarant is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant
176. Id. at 744.
177. Id. at 745.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. This exception, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129, 6A (2001), is very similar to Florida's
section 90.803(23). It creates a special exception for statements made by children in sex abuse
cases.
181. See Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d at 751-52.
182. See, e.g., State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435 (Iowa 2000); State v. Garner, 614 N.W.2d
319 (Neb. 2000); State v. Lopez, 993 P.2d 727 (N.M. 1999); Tartaglia v. Hodges, 10 P.3d 176
(N.M. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Rivers, 617 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
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is unavailable as a witness, as defined in subdivisions (a) and (b) of
Section 240, and all of the following are true:
(1) The party offering the statement has made a showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness regarding the statement, the
statement was made under circumstances which indicate its trustwor-
thiness, and the statement was not the result of promise, inducement,
threat, or coercion. In making its determination, the court may only
consider the circumstances that surround the making of the statement
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. (2) There
is no evidence that the unavailability of the declarant was caused by,
aided by, solicited by, or procured on the behalf of, the party who is
offering the statement. (3) The entire statement has been memorial-
ized in a videotape recording made by a law enforcement official
prior to the death of disabling of the declarant. (4) The statement was
made by the victim of the alleged violation. (5) The statement is sup-
ported by corroborative evidence. (6) The victim of the alleged viola-
tion is an individual who meets both of the following requirements:
(A) Was 65 years of age or older or was a dependent adult when the
alleged violation or attempted violation occurred. (B) At the time of
any criminal proceeding, including, but not limited to, a preliminary
hearing or trial, regarding the alleged violation or attempted viola-
tion, is either deceased or suffers from the infirmities of aging as
manifested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physi-
cal, mental, or emotional dysfunction, to the extent that the ability of
the person to provide adequately for the person's own care or protec-
tion is impaired. (b) If the prosecution intends to offer a statement
pursuant to this section, the prosecution shall serve as a written notice
upon the defendant at least 10 days prior to the hearing or trial at
which the prosecution intends to offer the statement, unless the prose-
cution shows good cause for the failure to provide that notice. In the
event that good cause is shown, the defendant shall be entitled to a
reasonable continuance of the hearing or trial. (c) If the statement is
offered during the trial, the court's determination as to the availability
of the victim as a witness shall be made out of the presence of the
jury. If the defendant elects to testify at the hearing on a motion
brought pursuant to this section, the court shall exclude from the
examination every person except the clerk, court reporter, the bailiff,
the prosecutor, the investigating officer, the defendant and his or her
counsel, and investigator for the defendant, and the officer having
custody of the defendant. Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the defendant's testimony at the hearing shall not be admissible
in any other proceeding except the hearing brought on the motion
pursuant to this section. If a transcript is made of the defendant's
testimony, it shall be sealed and transmitted to the clerk of the court
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in which the action is pending.' 83
California's statute is substantially similar to Florida's section
90.803(24). Both exceptions apply to those falling under the state's def-
inition of "elderly" in terms of both age and the manifestation of the
effects of their advanced age.' 84 Both statutes require notice to the party
against whom the statement is offered and a hearing to determine the
admissibility of the statements. The statutes' most important similarity
is that they both stress that the statement, to be admitted, must be "trust-
worthy." While California goes a bit further in its requirements by man-
dating that statements be videotaped and is more stringent in outlining
the hearing process, the core of the two statutes is the same. Both
exceptions seem to be in accord with the United States Supreme Court's
emphasis on the reliability of a statement.
Even more striking than the similarities between the statutes is the
fact that while Florida's section 90.803(24) has been declared unconsti-
tutional, California's section 1380 has not. Under the Florida Supreme
Court's reasoning in Conner, section 1380 would clearly be unconstitu-
tional in that it would be held to violate confrontation, be too broad, and
would also lack the policy support in the same manner that Florida's
exception does. Yet, California has not adjudged section 1380 to be
unconstitutional. 185 It seems that California has recognized the legiti-
macy of section 1380 and the need for its protection of the elderly,
unlike the Florida Supreme Court. Once again, the Florida Supreme
Court in its Conner decision seems to depart from the rest of the nation's
jurisprudence.
IV. POLICY SUPPORT FOR ELDERLY HEARSAY EXCEPTION
It also seems that the Florida Supreme Court has found error in
section 90.803(24) because it lacks policy support. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that literal confrontation should not be dis-
pensed with lightly. 86 The Supreme Court also recognizes that literal
confrontation must sometimes yield to other legitimate trial interests.187
The United States Supreme Court has held that because confronta-
tion is such a serious right, it should only be dispensed with when neces-
183. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1380 (West 2000).
184. The Florida statute applies to those above the age of sixty. The California statute applies
to those over sixty-five.
185. As of the publication of this Comment there is not case law challenging section 1380.
186. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) ("The right to cross-examine is
more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation ... ").
187. Id. at 295.
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sary to further an important public policy. 88 There must be a showing
that the admission will serve an interest greater than some "generalized,
'legislatively imposed presumption of trauma."" 89 Thus, statements
should only come in under a hearsay exception when there is a concern
based on more than just the legislature's assumption that such a need
exists. Since the required showing of necessity is implicit in most stat-
utes, a finding as to whether there are supporting policy interests seems
almost redundant.
Apparently, the Florida Supreme Court felt that the interests
espoused by the legislature in enacting the elderly hearsay exception
were not sufficient to support its constitutionality. 9o It found that while
there was adequate policy support for the child exception, those policies
were not present in the elderly adult context.' 91 To the contrary, the
elderly are a highly vulnerable class with as much need for a hearsay
exception as children.
Under the law as it stands today, if an elderly person is abused,
attacked, or falls victim to another form of exploitation, but subse-
quently becomes unavailable to testify before his sworn testimony with
cross-examination can be procured, that attacker will likely get away
with his crime if he is tried in a Florida state court. There is no way to
admit statements made by such victims now that section 90.803(24) has
been declared unconstitutional.
This is a particular problem in terms of the elderly because they
frequently do become "unavailable" under the law. In many cases, the
victim or witness dies. While the state should attempt to preserve such
testimony under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(j), 19 2 this is
not always practical with witnesses of fragile physical or mental
health. 193 Witnesses who are advanced in age may become physically ill
and unable to withstand the stresses of testifying. This is analogous to
the child abuse setting where courts frequently hold that young wit-
nesses can be declared unavailable for confrontation purposes to prevent
them from suffering emotional or mental distress as a result of testify-
ing.' 9' In the same way that facing their attacker can be traumatic and
distressing for young children, so too can such confrontation cause
188. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021
(1988)).
189. Id.
190. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 959 (Fla. 1999).
191. Id.
192. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900) makes provisions for the perpetuation of testimony. See supra
note 7 for text of the rule.
193. With a backlog of cases, litigation may drag on unexpectedly and older witnesses are
clearly at a higher risk of dying or becoming otherwise unavailable.
194. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1989); State v. Smith, 730 A.2d 311 (N.J. 1999).
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trauma and distress to elderly adults. In terms of the elderly, the risk of
this stress making a witness unavailable is even greater because of the
marked decrease in vitality that is possible over the course of lengthy
litigation proceedings.
This problem emerged in the case of State v. Hays, but the prosecu-
tors were able to save the testimony before it was too late.' 95 Mr. Hays
was accused of armed carjacking, robbery with a deadly weapon, and
aggravated battery on a person sixty-five-years or older. He allegedly
attacked eighty-year-old Dorothy Freedman as she went to work at
Office Depot at 5:45 a.m. on July 4, 2000 in West Palm Beach. While
Mr. Hays was scheduled to go to trial within three months of the attack,
Ms. Freeman had been suffering from throbbing headaches, sudden falls,
and bouts of depression. The state feared she might pass away or
become otherwise unavailable during the three months until trial. While
Ms. Freeman made a 911 call and a statement to the police, these state-
ments were not admissible under Florida law after Conner, so the state
had to take other steps to save the testimony. Had they been unable to
do so, however, Mr. Hays could have walked away a free man.
This case illustrates why there is a need for an exception that would
protect any prior statements which are deemed to be reliable. Ms. Free-
man's statements may never have been admitted if her headaches had
gotten worse or one of her falls turned out to be something more serious
than dizziness. The possibility that illness will prevent an older person
from testifying is a real one. More likely in the case of the elderly is the
possibility that the declarant will develop a mental infirmity, which
would interfere with her capacity to testify. Dementia and Alzheimer's
disease are ailments which are prevalent in older adults and which
would render them incompetent witnesses. Alzheimer's disease afflicts
over four million people nationwide and usually affects those over the
age of sixty-five. 96 Witnesses suffering from these diseases may have
been reliable, competent witnesses at one point, but may be totally
incompetent by trial.' 9 7 These diseases are even more problematic
because once they have emerged, that declarant's testimony will have
lost its ability to be declared reliable. Here again, we see the particular
importance of having a safety net for prior statements made by the eld-
erly. The elderly can become like children in many circumstances and it
seems incongruent to allow a hearsay exception for one group while
excluding the other.
195. John Pacenti, 80-Year-Old Recounts Savage Beating, Victim Couldn't Bear to Hear 911
Tape Played, PALM BCH. POST, Aug. 31, 2000, at IA.
196. Alzheimer's Disease Education & Referral Center, Alzheimer's Disease Fact Sheet
(August 1995), available at http://www.alzheimers.org/pubs/adfact.html.
197. See id.
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Mr. Conner tried to make the stretch between an elderly person's
failings and the statute's requirements. Mr. Conner tried to argue in his
brief to the Florida Supreme Court that the statute's requirement of fit-
ting the definition of "elderly" necessarily precludes a proper finding of
reliability.' 98 This argument fundamentally misunderstands the elderly
adult definition.
The elderly adult definition calls for a finding that the older person
cannot care for himself, not that he is incompetent. 99 As the state
pointed out in its brief to the Florida Supreme Court:
An individual's inability to physically care for all his or her own
needs does not necessarily impact on his or her mental competence to
any degree whatsoever-it can hardly be seriously contended that the
fact of being legally blind or hearing impaired, even to the point of
total blindness or deafness, adversely affects one's memory or ren-
ders him a liar! Obviously, a blind person will not be able to describe
the perpetrator's appearance, and a deaf person will not be able to
identify the perpetrator's voice, but an individual with some sensory
disability will well be able to supply information gleaned by use of
his or remaining senses. And it is certainly true that some elderly
persons, by virtue of their disability, such as the poor memory with
which some are afflicted and of which Petitioner complains, may be
unreliable, untrustworthy witnesses, but, in such cases, the defen-
dant's remedy is to challenge the reliability and trustworthiness of
their statements, which the statute contemplates.2 °°
While it is not true that an elderly witness is by definition unreliable, it
is highly likely that an elderly declarant may become incompetent to
testify. This likelihood highlights the strong need for section
90.803(24).
Even the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the strong state
interest in protecting the elderly. "[W]e as a court condemn in the
strongest terms acts of exploitation or violence committed against per-
sons who are elderly .... It is fundamentally unfair and inconsistent
that the state would take extra measures to protect its youngest class of
citizens but decline to take such steps to guard its oldest class.
CONCLUSION
While the Florida Supreme Court's concern for protecting the
198. Initial Br. for Pet. on the Merits at 26, Conner v. State, 709 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA
1998) (No. 92,835).
199. Resp't Br. on the Merits at 7, Conner v. State, 709 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (No.
92,835).
200. Id. at 7-8.
201. Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 960 (Fla. 1999).
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accused is an important one, it does not justify the automatic disregard
of society's interest in bringing those who prey upon the elderly to jus-
tice. The exclusion of hearsay is designed to protect the defendant and
the exceptions that have been adopted are designed to protect society's
interests. The elderly hearsay exception is the means for protecting our
elder citizens while still respecting the rights of the accused.
The Florida Supreme Court found section 90.803(24) was in need
of judicial supplementation, violated the defendant's right to Confronta-
tion, was too broad, and was not supported by sufficient policy concerns
to justify its existence. These concerns are at odds with a predominance
of case law both within Florida and without the nation. Basically, if the
Florida Supreme Court is correct, a significant number of United States
Supreme Court cases as well as many decisions by state supreme courts
are wrong and laws in jurisdictions across the United States are
unconstitutional.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that only a
showing of some indicia of reliability is required for hearsay statements
to be in accord with a defendant's right to confrontation. In terms of
section 90.803(24), these indicia of reliability require a showing of par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Through its provisions, sec-
tion 90.803(24) clearly adheres to this requirement of the United States
Supreme Court. Given that the elderly hearsay exception would pass
constitutional muster as defined by the United States Supreme Court, it
is difficult to resolve how the exception can be declared unconstitutional
by the Florida Supreme Court.
The court's invalidation of section 90.803(24) because of an inabil-
ity to formulate a list of factors with which to determine reliability is
also at odds with the United States Supreme Court. There is no need for
judicial guidelines as to how to measure statements sought to be admit-
ted under section 90.803(24) when all that is necessary is judicial discre-
tion. In fact, it is this discretion and flexibility that the United States
Supreme Court has lauded in its assessment of the admissibility of hear-
say statements in Idaho v. Wright and subsequent decisions. While it is
commendable that the Florida Supreme Court sought to give the trial
courts guidance with its decision in Townsend, the court went too far
when it ruled that guiding factors were not just desirable, but required.
While the Townsend list may enhance a court's ability to determine reli-
ability in child sexual abuse cases, it does not assist in measuring relia-
bility in physical abuse cases. Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has stressed the need for ad hoc determinations as to particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness and not the factors used in such deter-
minations. Yet, it was the Florida Supreme Court's inability to
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formulate such a list in the elderly abuse setting that led to section
90.803(24)'s invalidation. This lack of supplemental factors forms a
questionable basis for invalidating section 90.803(24), especially when
the United States Supreme Court discourages this type of rigid list.
The Florida Supreme Court's next rationale, the scope of section
90.803(24), is most perplexing when one attempts to reconcile the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's analysis with the acceptance of far more broad
laws in courts throughout the nation. Florida's former elderly hearsay
exception was an even more narrow exception than the federal govern-
ment's residual hearsay exception as well as other states' residual excep-
tions. Our highest court has not considered these residual exceptions to
be too broad. Yet, the Florida Supreme Court takes issue with the more
limited breadth of section 90.803(24). Based on the court's reasoning,
Rule 807, as well as the residual hearsay exceptions on the books in
states across the nation, would be unconstitutional. The odds are against
Florida being an astute minority of one.
Finally, the idea that there are insufficient policy reasons to support
an elderly hearsay exception seems to ignore the fact that our elderly
need protection and they are at a great risk of becoming unavailable.
Besides the fact that the United States Supreme Court has held that it is
the reliability inquiry that should govern admissibility, the tangential
question of supporting policy reasons seems to be answered in terms of
section 90.803(24). All classes of citizens deserve the protection that
exceptions like the elderly hearsay exception can provide. To say other-
wise would also be at odds with the approval of residual hearsay excep-
tions across the nation, which seek to protect the rights of people
generally without regard to a specific age or policy interest.
Regardless of the strength of the statements at issue in Conner, an
issue the court never reached, section 90.803(24) should not have been
declared unconstitutional. Clearly, there are weaknesses in the Florida
Supreme Court's ruling in Conner. The court seems to misstate the
United States Supreme Court's holdings and does not even attempt to
use the facts of the federal cases it cites as support for its reasoning. We
can only hope that either the Florida Legislature will make another
attempt to maintain this important legislation, or that a higher court will
overturn this decision. Until that time, we are left with a scheme that
puts criminals' interests before those of the older members of our soci-
ety and those of society's interests as a whole.
It is true that not all hearsay should be allowed into the courtroom
setting. It is also true that a defendant's right to confront the witnesses
against him is an integral part of protecting his right to a fair trial.
Courts must proceed with caution, however, before striking down hear-
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say protections which form the last line of defense for a uniquely vulner-
able segment of the population. The Florida Supreme Court failed to
exercise this caution when it struck down section 90.803(24) in Conner,
and it is the state's elderly who will pay the price.
STACEY SCHULMAN
